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One of the characteristics of a system of free private enterprise is that private
decision establishes the boundaries between administrative control and market bargaining. The relations of business enterprises to each other are determined primarily
by a constant and flexible process of negotiation and bargaining which is given an
occasional evanescent stability by a long-term contract. The internal organization
of each enterprise is based not upon bargaining but upon structure. Materials and
equipment are subject to a coordinated control, and even personal services, once the
employment relation is established, are subject to continuous direction by the management. In spite of internal conflicts of interest, the institutions of ownership
usually channel the activities of an enterprise toward its own greatest profit, whereas
the broader organization of an industry and of the economic commonwealth is
established by the interaction of frankly conflicting interests.
Generally speaking there are no limits to the shape and direction of an enterprise and no limits to its size other than those ultimate ones which may be established by the laws against monopoly. Those in control may produce any combination of commodities and services, however diverse, and may, as they choose, perform
a single operation or the complete series of operations between raw material and
consumer. There is room for an infinite diversity in the structure of different concerns, so that short-line producers and long-line producers, handicraft establishments and mechanized plants, single and multiple unit manufacturing companies,
producers who buy and producers who make their raw material may exist side by
side in the same industry. The grouping of products for joint production or distribution may be so diverse that there are no boundaries between one industry and
the next except as they may be arbitrarily defined for some statistical purpose. In
distribution the specialty shop and the department store, the independent unit and
the corporate or voluntary chain, the consumers' cooperative and the manufacturers'
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outlet may vie with each other in the same city block and may range in size from
a glassed-in alcove to a many-storied building.
As the arts of management have been elaborated, many concerns have developed
corporate structures within which economic processes are related neither by the armslength bargaining of the market nor by the fiat of a single management, but by a
loose managerial alliance, intermediate in character. Equipment companies, management companies, wholly-owned subsidiaries for the manufacture of by-products,
marketing subsidiaries, semi-autonomous product divisions, and the like may be
viewed for some purposes as separate enterprises and for others as parts of a tight
community of interest. For the most part such extrusions of managerial control are
likewise unrestrained by authority. The single concern may exist side by side with
a bewildering variety of holding company structures.
Insofar as the over-all structural boundaries of business enterprise are determined
by private initiative and the arbitrament of market competition, the test for the
success of any union of economic processes under any kind of managerial structure
is merely its ability to survive. If it appears to offer no advantage to%business men,
present or prospective, it will not be created. If it cannot resist attacks by other
types of enterprise, it will be destroyed. Business types will endure and attain dominance or will disappear and be superseded as an incident of market competition in
the same way that biological species undergo an evolutionary selection through their
efforts to feed and reproduce.
Business groups which feel themselves threatened in the conflict between different
types of business structure are beginning to turn to public authority for aid, and as
it becomes apparent that the boundaries of an enterprise may be partially determined
by law an increasing number of economic groups undertake a political competition
for laws favoring their own type of structure or handicapping some rival type. That
every such bill has the backing of one or more economic groups may be taken for
granted. The Department of Justice has had occasion to point out in legal proceedings the effort made by certain ice cream manufacturers to establish sanitary requirements which would make it practically impossible for a drug store to manufacture
its own ice cream in counter freezers. A bill is now being considered in the California
legislature which seeks to limit the activities of chain stores by providing that no
enterprise which owns more than two retail establishments may engage in manufacturing. This bill has the backing of certain groups of independent retailers who
would like to make it impossible for chains to sell private brands which are not
subject to the price control imposed by other statutes; and likewise the backing of
some manufacturers who believe they could sell a larger volume with a greater
bargaining power if their chain-store customers were deprived of the alternative
opportunity to make the goods themselves.
Unfortunately the mere fact that a legislative proposal is intended to advance the
competitive interest of some private group is insufficient to discredit the proposal or
to indicate its relation to the public interest. If the fighting power of a business
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enterprise were an adequate measure of its efficiency as a source of goods and services, free competition in the determination of business boundaries might be thought
undoubtedly desirable. But to a generation which sees no necessary parallel between pecuniary results and economic efficiency, the matter is not so simple. A
concern may be strong because it has achieved great bargaining power or because
it has reserves which enable it to survive financial shocks that would destroy its
rivals. An efficient concern may be weak because it lacks the money to weather a
temporary emergency or because it is not armored against an unfair attack. In
business, as in international relations, the way of life which makes for security in
defense and for power in attack may be sharply different from that which the community would like to encourage.
Since the problems raised by size and corporate structure are dealt with elsewhere in this series of articles,' the issues as to the boundaries of business enterprise
which are to be discussed herein will be limited to those involved in selling more
than one product or engaging in more than one of the successive stages of production and distribution. Within this field certain outstanding problems may be indicated and illustrated, but the available information is not yet such as to permit a
comprehensive account of the extent and relative importance of each problem.'
A preliminary distinction must be made between restrictions upon the boundary
of an enterprise which express the public authority's desire to restrain trade and
restrictions which have other purposes. In the distribution of alcoholic beverages
some states forbid the producer to engage in wholesaling and a great many states
forbid him to engage in retailing. The underlying theory of such legislation is
presumably derived from the widespread belief that the sale of alcoholic liquor
is inherently dangerous and that much is to be gained by a close control
over the conditions of sale and a restriction upon the quantity sold. Prior
to national prohibition, the manufacturers' control over saloons was regarded as
partly responsible for efforts to sell liquor in quantities which encouraged drunkenness and conditions of vice and disorder that flouted the wishes of a large part of a
community. In some jurisdictions the effort to make alcoholic beverages available
without unduly promoting their sale has resulted in a system of state liquor stores
intended to destroy the profit incentive in the retail liquor trade. The state laws
which exclude the manufacturer from distribution presumably express a milder form
of intention to limit the effort to build up a large volume of retail business. They
prevent a competitive establishment of saloon outlets similar to the competitive establishment of filling stations which at times has been so conspicuous in the petroleum
industry.
Legislation of this kind is obviously inapplicable to the great majority of indusI See Wolff, Monopolistic Competition in Distribution;Feldman, Legislative Opposition to Chain Stores
and Its Minimization, both inIra this issue.
- Cook, Legislative Restrictions on Marketing Integration, supra this issue, measures the field and its
subdivisions quantitatively.
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tries in which the community accepts the desirability of a larger output and is
willing to obtain this output through the ordinary stimulus of the profit motive.
The most obvious issue which is involved in most attempts to enlarge a business
by undertaking new types of activities is that of the power which may be exercised
by the combination. There are several important kinds and degrees of such power.
When a concern which sells a considerable number of different products has
obtained a strong bargaining position upon any one of these products, it is likely to
be able to extend its bargaining power to cover the other products as well. The
control over the product from which power is derived may be strong or weak; it
may be due to a patent, to an unlawful monopoly, to the prestige of a well-advertised
brand, or to peculiar qualities in the product itself. Such variations may affect both
the number of the customers who find it necessary to buy this product and the
degree to which each of them can be coerced. But, in any case, the seller has an
opportunity to make his sale of the desired product conditional upon the customer's purchase of other commodities from him rather than from his rivals. By thus
forcing his full line into the market, the seller handicaps any other seller who is
unable to exercise a similar pressure. If the extent of the seller's power is not sufficient to support an arbitrary requirement that he receive all his customer's trade,
inducements may be offered to persuade the customer. Special services and sales
helps may be given to the full-line customer but not to others. Discounts may be
so arranged that customers who buy less than the full line must pay higher prices.
Special offers of the desired products packaged with some of the undesired ones may
be advertised to the public at attractive prices. In some cases the exclusion of rival
products from the market may be as effective as though purchase of the full line
had been flatly required. Other cases may show a reduced effectiveness, to the point
at which it is problematical whether the seller obtains any advantage.
The power to win trade by such requirements is greatest when there is no particular reason why the buyer should make his purchases elsewhere. Under such
circumstances the attractiveness of the desired product is not likely to be lessened
by the restrictions upon its purchase and it probably can be sold at a price as high
as though no conditions were attached to the sale. But even if the seller must
sacrifice a part of his power to charge a high price for his popular product, he may
be richly rewarded by a progressive enlargement of the number of commodities
over which he has substantial control. Problems of this kind are so familiar in the
administration of the antitrust laws that the public policy applicable to them was
crystallized as long ago as 1914 in Section 3 of the Clayton Act, which forbids sales
of goods in which either the sale or the price is conditional upon an agreement not
to buy the products of competitors. In practice, any arrangement which has the
practical effect of preventing purchases from competitors is prohibited by this section.
Moreover, where such practices are effective they are likely to be regarded as attempts to create a monopoly and therefore as violations of the Sherman Act. The
packers' consent decree, which forbids the great meat packers from manufacturing
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or handling a large number of food products not directly connected with the meatpacking business, is an illustration of the use of the Sherman Act to break up an
extension of market control over a longer line of products.
The sale of a variety of products sometimes enlarges the marketing strength of
the producer merely because of the number of products sold, even though no one
of these commodities may be a source of any special power. Since the customer
incurs expense and inconvenience in finding sources of supply and in bargaining
with them, he may prefer to obtain his requirements, so far as possible, from a
single source. It is notorious, for example, that department stores often have higher
average mark-ups than more specialized retail outlets and yet have a more rapid
turnover, largely due to the fact that many shoppers find it convenient to remain
under one roof. Similar considerations may influence commercial buyers. Moreover, the seller merchandising a large number of products may be able to offer
services which could not be readily supplied by a specialized concern. When he
ships, he may send carload quantities to communities too small to take a carload
of one or two products. With his warehousing and sales expense spread over more
products, he may be able to undertake a more intensive sales campaign. The department store may be able to afford a free parking lot; the manufacturer may
supply the services of a demonstrator. The mere fact that income is derived from
many commodities which are subject to different kinds of demand and different
seasonal peaks and which are affected by the different prices for different raw
materials may in itself reduce the over-all fluctuations of the enterprise's prosperity.
Insofar as these commodities are derived from the same source or are sold to the
same customers, the concern handling them may attain an importance for those
with whom it deals which cannot be seriously diminished by its price policy or its
service in selling any one item. Thus it may attain a degree of freedom from competitive comparison by the mere diversity of its sales.
A variety of products likewise affords the enterprise great attacking power in
the competitive sale of any part of its products. Being independent of the revenue
from a particular product or product line, the multiple-line producer is free to cut
prices much further and continue his cuts much longer than a concern which derives its whole revenue from those products upon which the cut takes place. Therefore, the producer of a limited line of products is likely to be at his mercy. A
department store, for example, can adopt a low-price policy upon books with a hope
that the general revenue of the store will be increased by customers who are attracted
by the book department but also spend money in other departments. The smaller
bookseller, however, may find it difficult to match the department store's low prices.
This competition between unspecialized and specialized sellers should be sharply
distinguished from so-called loss leader selling; for in the mere use of loss leaders
the products reduced in price represent only a small part of the trade of any one
of the competitors and the price reduction is therefore of much less consequence.
The price cutting which a concern selling many lines can undertake against a con-
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cern selling a few is similar to that which can be undertaken by a nation-wide concern against a local one. It covers the victim's whole market, but is of minor
importance to the aggressor.
Very frequently, however, the low prices which may be charged upon certain
goods in a long line may be developed without malice against any competitor, as
an expression of some of the opportunities and economies involved in extending the
business. A going concern can often produce or distribute additional products at a
relatively low cost. One factor which encouraged the meat packers to go into the
grocery business was the fact that they had storage facilities, shipping facilities, and
a sales organization well adapted to handle other food products than meat and that
consequently they could distribute these products with less additional expense than
they would have incurred in building up a separate grocery enterprise. In many
lines of manufacture there are scrap or waste products which the management learns
to adapt to some useful purpose but which might not be produced if the basic
manufacturing processes were not already being carried on for the sake of other
commodities. In all such cases, whether the economies arise in production or distribution, the essential point is the fact that since some expenses have already been
incurred the additional sales are profitable even if they do not carry their full share
of those expenses. Commodities sold under such conditions are always by-products
in the sense that they need not cover a proportionate share of the total costs.
A problem arises wherever one concern's by-product is the basic product of a
competing concern. Drug stores can outdo electric appliance shops in the sale of
simple appliances. Grocery stores can outdo drug stores in the sale of packaged
cosmetics or drugs. The convenience outlets for candy and tobacco may often charge
prices so low that they would be ruinous to the confectioner or tobacconist. A
small-town newspaper may do job printing at rates which cannot be matched by
an independent printer. The victims usually insist that low prices thus established
constitute unfair competition and are based upon an untenable allocation of costs.
The producers of by-products point to their ability to render the same service indefinitely at the same low prices and argue that the public gains by every use of
idle facilities and waste materials. When the output of the by-product can become
large enough to supply the market, the independent producer of the commodity is
probably doomed, for the grouping of product and by-product together in the same
enterprise will become typical; but when the market must rely in part upon the
independent producer, there may be a long period during which his solvency is
intermittently threatened at such times as the total demand is low enough to induce
the seller of the by-product to quote low prices.
In some cases strategic advantage lies with the business which handles only a
few lines rather than many. This is typically true when some products move more
rapidly or require less expense than others with which they have been traditionally
associated. A drug store, for example, carries popular lines of packaged drugs
which have a rapid sale, less popular lines which move slowly, and various prescrip-
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tion drugs which may be asked for on rare occasions. The time and skill used in
filling a prescription are much greater than in selling a packaged product. In the
last few years large cities have developed stores which carry only the fast-moving
packaged drug items and therefore can do business at a much lower cost than the
ordinary drug store. A similar concentration upon the more profitable business is
apparent in many food supermarkets.
The development of such low-priced specialty businesses is typically accompanied
by insistence on the part of the older enterprises that it is unfair to take the cream
of the market and expect someone else to supply the skimmed milk. They argue
that the less profitable parts of their activity must be preserved in the public interest
and cannot be preserved alone. The defenders of the new concerns which have a
narrow scope emphasize not only the importance of business freedom but the desirability of distributing any product as cheaply as possible. From the public point
of view, the issue may be defined as a controversy over social cost accounting. Customers for fast-moving lines were formerly asked to subsidize other products. The
new way of doing business gives them the opportunity to avoid this subsidy, and
will result either in disappearance of the unprofitable products and services, in higher
prices upon them, or in a subsidy derived from some new source. The period of
readjustment is likely to prove painful to concerns which are already established,
but no more so than many of the other changes in the location of the boundaries
of business enterprise.
In the union of successive stages of manufacture and distribution there may be
problems of competition among concerns of different scope similar to those described above, but such integration also involves special problems not raised by an
extension of the line of products handled. The most obvious of these is the squeezing of competitors by a concern to which these competitors must look for their
supplies. For many years the Aluminum Company has produced all the aluminum
ingot made in the United States and has also been a substantial fabricator of this
ingot. Independent fabricators selling in competition with the Aluminum Company
have found it necessary to pay the company's price for ingot and to charge prices
no higher than the company's for their finished product. Since it was a matter of
indifference to the integrated concern whether its profits were derived from ingot
or from fabricated products, it was easy to keep the price of ingot high and thus
reduce the fabricator's margin. The Bausch Machine Tool Company brought suit
on the ground that this device had been used to make the independent manufacture
of duralumin unprofitable and thus to extend the Aluminum Company's business
in the manufactured products 3 Similar charges have been made against the large
steel makers, the large copper companies, and various other integrated enterprises.
Except where the integrated concern has a substantial control of supply, the availability of materials from other sources makes such a squeeze impossible.
3

Bausch Machine Tool Co. v. Aluminum Co., 72 F. (2d) 236 (C. C. A. 2d, 1934), cert. denied,

293 U. S. 589 (1934).
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By discrimination in favor of its own distributive outlets an integrated system of
manufacture and distribution may decrease the ability of an independent distributor
to serve his customers. A recent antitrust proceeding against large motion picture
producers and distributors illustrates this possibility. The government charged that
theatres which are affiliated with large producers and some chains of theatres not so
affiliated were given first choice of pictures and earlier exhibition dates for the pictures they chose. The advantage of such chains was increased by granting them
permission to select the features they would exhibit and also to select other features
for options or rental contracts which would prevent the first-run exhibition of these
features by independents. Independent theatres were required to accept all feature
pictures offered by the producer in order to get any of them and were likewise required to accept the producer's short subjects to fill out the programs. Independents
were also placed at a disadvantage by high film rentals, discrimination in various
fees and services, and requirements that their admission charges for second-run pictures be unduly high.
An experimental decree was entered last fall which protects the independent distributor from the requirement that he accept newsreels and other short subjects; increases his ability to choose among feature pictures by forbidding the lease of such
pictures in blocks of more than five; and establishes an arbitration system to deal
with the many complicated problems involved in timing the release of pictures to
competing theatres. During a three-year trial period, the decree provides, the defendants will not enter upon a general program of expanding their theatre holdings,
and the government will not take further steps to divorce production and distribution of motion pictures from exhibition of them. Whether or not the limited provisions of the decree will be sufficient to enable independent theatres to compete
effectively with affiliates of the producers will appear from experience under the
decree.
The attack upon manufacture by chain stores which is now getting under way
raises a different issue. Organized groups of independent merchants, particularly
in the food field, have been attempting for years to prevent chain stores from
underselling them at retail. One stage in this campaign was support for an amendment of the Clayton Act which reduced the opportunity for the chain buyer to
purchase goods from the same manufacturer more cheaply than could the independent. Another step was support for state legislation designed to permit the
manufacturer of identified goods to fix resale prices which everyone must observe.
Although this legislation was of primary interest in the drug trade, in which it
hampered price-cutting independents and department stores rather than chains, it
was used to some extent in the food industries to control chain-store prices. A third
step was support for legislation which forbade sale at retail below cost. However,
the food chains have partially escaped the impact of such laws by manufacturing
their own products, thus avoiding any issue of price discrimination, and transferring
these products to their retail establishments on terms which make possible a low
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retail price. A successful effort to force them out of manufacturing would eliminate
one of the remaining means by which they continue to follow their own price
policies.
Any general refusal to allow a user or retailer of a product to engage in manufacturing would have the effect in some cases of weakening resistance to the
monopoly power of an organized selling group. One reason that industrial concerns, mail-order houses, department stores, and chains can often buy cheaply is the
fact that if the price is higher than a reasonable cost of manufacture the purchaser
may. be in a position to produce the article for himself. Ford has been particularly
active in producing a portion of each important article he buys in order to have a
check upon the reasonableness of the prices he pays and a nucleus for the expansion
of his own output if he cannot buy advantageously.
The joint management of successive processes in production and distribution
sometimes involves a special opportunity to be more efficient. The dovetailing of
processes in the manufacture of Ford automobiles, for example, has been carried
so far that, by previous standards, inventories are negligible. In steel manufacture
the close juxtaposition of successive processes often enables a large concern to eliminate in part the cooling and reheating of steel. It also enables an integrated concern to adapt the composition of alloys very closely to the requirements of subsequent metallurgical processes and to experiment freely with both the metal and
the means of working it. In so far as a concern produces its own supplies, it is relieved
of much of the market uncertainty and the sales activity which are inherent in bargaining relations between independent enterprises.
However, some of the most obvious of the efficiencies developed by vertical
integration may be subject to a serious discount for the disturbances which they set
up elsewhere in the economic system. The efficiency of the large automobile plant
is achieved by creating inefficiencies in the plants which supply it. Deliveries of
upholstery material, for example, are ordered, suspended, delayed, cancelled, and
reordered as suits the automobile company, often with little regard for the production
and inventory cost of the upholstery manufacturer. The inventories of independent
sources of supply take the place of inventories in the automobile plant, and the
intermittent activity of these independents becomes the basis upon which the automobile producer obtains flexibility without waste.
Moreover, a vertically integrated concern loses some opportunities to profit by
the misfortunes of others. Though it need pay no unnecessary profits to its controlled sources of supply, it must meet their costs, whereas at times the independent
buyer may purchase his supplies at distress prices. Though no exorbitant mark-ups
need to be allowed to controlled outlets, the concern which does its own distributing
loses the opportunity to use the many distributive outlets which spend more than
their mark-up in distribution. It does not get the benefit of the market coverage
which can be afforded by a retailing system in which there are often too many stores
too close together to make profits.
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The foregoing summary of some of the more obvious problems as to the boundary
of an enterprise is intended to illustrate the point that public intervention is sometimes desirable, but that it may easily do more harm than good. Both multiple lines
and vertical integration may be used to promote efficiency as well as to extend or
consolidate excessive bargaining power. No crude standard which accepts one type
of structure and rejects another would be adequate to express the differences between
cases.

Intervention by law may take several different forms. It may be based upon the
broad principles of antitrust legislation and may ask the courts to decide the applicability of these principles, case by case. It may seek to outlaw particular types
of structural relationship, like manufacturing by chain stores, or particular uses of
power, like full-line forcing, in statutes applicable to all industry. It may be
specifically directed to the problem raised in a particular industry, as are most of
the statutes discussed in the immediately preceding article.
The advantage of dealing with such problems case by case under the antitrust
laws lies in the fact that the results of a particular expansion of activity in a particular industry become the basis for action. Where no problem of monopoly or of
unreasonable restriction of trade has arisen, a business may be left free to attain
whatever private and public advantages are associated with the handling of more
lines of goods or with a more complete vertical integration. Yet the public authority
may act to terminate a program of expansion designed to drive out independents,
whether by squeezing their operating margins, by predatory price cutting upon the
products important to them, or by any other device. The fact that federal enforcement agencies have been given so little staff that until the last two or three years
they could make no serious attempt to enforce the antitrust laws has prevented the
efficacy of this procedure from being demonstrated by experience. Even now the
funds for enforcing the Sherman Act are probably not more than one fourth as
large as they must be if the Antitrust Division is to do a systematic job. The lack
of antitrust laws in some states and of adequate machinery for administering
these laws in most states has prevented the use of similar technique in dealing
with horizontal and vertical combinations of economic processes in intrastate
commerce. Nevertheless, the antitrust procedure remains the most flexible means
of distinguishing between public and private interests in this field.
The difficulty in outlawing particular forms of structure or of behavior lies in
the fact that the statute may prevent much which is harmless or even beneficial.
Whether or not manufacture by chain stores is a problem which calls for public
action, it is clear that some manufacturers who maintain retail outlets and some
retailers who make a part of their own supplies are not thereby causing harm. Indeed, the increase of efficiency and avoidance of exploitation which may sometimes
go with vertical integration has been illustrated in the foregoing discussion. There
is a distinct possibility that the large distributors at whom the proposed statute is
aimed might be able to protect themselves by purchasing the entire output of a
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normally independent producer, whereas smaller distributors would be more effectively prevented from acquiring a control over production.
Similarly, a statute which strikes at full-line forcing raises abundant problems
as to borderline practices which have only a limited effect upon competitors but may
contribute to low-cost distribution by the concern adopting the practice. The federal statute is designed to deal with the more flagrant restraints rather than with
these marginal cases. It is doubtful whether there have been many successful proceedings under Section 3 of the Clayton Act where the situation did not also involve
a violation of the Sherman Act.
As to the statutes setting up restrictions in a single industry which are described
in Miss Cook's article, the resort to political weapons by private competitors is
much clearer to the outside observer than is the public interest which is supposed
to underly each such statute. The attack upon the soda fountain lunch is evident
in the laws which forbid sale of food in rooms where other commodities are sold.
There is obvious question whether the mere presence or absence of other commodities in a room is a significant guide as to whether the vendor has met the
reasonable needs of sanitation. The attack upon the sale of appliances by public
utilities obviously reflects the interest of independent merchants who are afraid
of the marketing advantages enjoyed by utility companies. Where regulation of
such sales consists merely in a requirement that the utility operations of the concern
be kept separate from its other activities, the statute is obviously useful in preventing
confusion in public utility control. But where an attempt is made to handicap or
prevent the sale of appliances by utility companies, the public problem involved is
often no greater than in many other unregulated instances in which one or more
concerns obtain an advantage in a line of business incidental to their principal
acitivities.

There is no need to multiply illustrations. At best, legislation which proceeds
industry by industry invites the maximum amount of pressure from organized industry groups and creates the maximum difficulty for legislators in maintaining consistent standards of public interest without special favors for particular groups. Undue
power acquired by extending the boundaries of an enterprise to cover additional
activities is best dealt with, like other forms of undue competitive power, by a
statute aimed at the objectionable results rather than at the means and applicable
to the entire field of competitive industry rather than to a special group.

